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 The Court considered whether the admission of gruesome photographs showing the 
disfigured bodies of the victims following their deaths and the subsequent autopsies amounted to 
an abuse of the district court’s discretion. The Court concluded that admission of these photographs 




 On the morning of February 21, 2013, the appellant Ammar Harris was partying at a Las 
Vegas nightclub with several women. Kenneth Cherry and Freddy Walters, victims in this case, 
were also present at the valet of the club. As Harris was leaving the club with the women, he 
remembered that he forgot his jacket and returned to the club to retrieve it. While Harris was 
absent, an argument occurred. One of the women with Harris saw a man waving around a gun. 
The woman found Harris and told him of the incident. In response, Harris went to his vehicle and 
retrieved a firearm from the glovebox and told the woman to use it if necessary. Harris then 
approached Cherry’s vehicle, but Cherry drove away from the club. 
 Harris and the women left the club and drove down the Las Vegas Strip. Harris pulled 
alongside Cherry and cut him off. Harris informed his passenger to roll down her window and to 
lean back. Harris engaged with Cherry. Harris then fired at Cherry, striking and killing Cherry. 
Harris also fired and hit Walters, who did not die but was injured. When the bullet struck and killed 
Cherry, his foot pressed the gas pedal and the vehicle accelerated to a rate of roughly eighty-eight 
miles per hour. The vehicle collided with several vehicles, ultimately striking a taxicab, which then 
burst into flames. The driver of the taxicab, Michael Bolden, and his passenger Sandra Sutton died 
from the injuries they sustained in the crash and the subsequent fire. 
 Harris was charged with the murders of Cherry, Bolden, and Sutton, and with the attempted 
murder of Walters. The State sought the death penalty for each of the three (3) murders. Harris 
presented a defense of self-defense and a lack of premeditation due to intoxication. The State 
successfully argued that surveillance video and other testimony did not show that Cherry or 
Walters were acting in any threatening matter. Further, the State successfully argued that even if 
Harris was intoxicated, he was not so intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent to be 
guilty of first-degree murder. At trial, the jury found Harris guilty. After a penalty hearing, the jury 




The admission of the photographs was harmless 
 
 The primary issue before the Court was whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it admitted photographs of the victims. Harris attempted to exclude the photographs before 
trial. The State explained the photographs were necessary to show the manner in which the victims 
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were found, the extent of the injuries, and the cause of their deaths. Harris did not dispute any of 
these points, but the district court still admitted the photographs despite agreeing that the images 
were disturbing. The Court reviewed the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.2 
 The photographs at issue where highly probative and can thus be admitted regardless of 
their graphic content. However, NRS 48.035(1) requires the district court to perform a balancing 
test to determine if an evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.3 The Court found the district court did not employ a meaningful weighing of the 
potential for unfair prejudice against each photograph’s probative value. Thus, the district court 
failed to fulfill its role as a gatekeeper for properly determining, on a case-by-case basis, what 
evidence should and should not be admitted.4 The photographs could easily inflame the jury, 
tempting them to decide based on emotion rather than reason. The probative value was outweighed 
by the unfair prejudice because the State did not need the photographs to prove an important fact 
and because the State had other evidence for its case, sufficient to satisfy its burden of proof. 
 Because the district court abused its discretion, the Court needed to determine if the error 
was harmless. Nonconstitutional errors are only reversible if the error, “had a substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”5 The admission of the photographs 
was harmless error because most of the events were captured on video and gaps where filled in 
with eyewitness testimony. 
 
Other assertions of error 
 
 Harris’ other assertions of error included: (1) right to a fair trial was violated when the trial 
was broadcasted and reported on by the media; (2) the district court should have been given an 
instruction regarding voluntary intoxication; (3) he was entitled to a new trial because the verdict 
form did not allow the jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter; (4) prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred because during the penalty phase, the prosecutor stated that Harris would not 
feel remorse in prison and that a life sentence for each victim would mean that Harris would not 
be separately punished for killing three people; (5) he should not be eligible for the death penalty 
for the murders of Bolden and Sutton because he did not intend to kill them; (6) the district court 
should have granted a motion to compel the State to produce data and statistics regarding the death 
penalty; and (7) cumulative error deprived him of due process. 
 The Court briefly analyzed and rejected these arguments, based upon the following: (1) 
Harris did not demonstrate that the media coverage of his trial was unduly pervasive nor did he 
discuss whether the media coverage deprived him of a fair trial; (2) Harris did not adequately 
explain why the instruction regarding voluntary intoxication should have been given; (3) because 
the jury was properly instructed on the necessary elements of voluntary manslaughter and there 
was overwhelming support for the jury’s decision to find Harris guilty of first-degree murder, 
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failure to give a complete verdict form was harmless error; (4) Harris did not object to the 
prosecutor’s statement that he would not feel remorse in prison and the appeal did not demonstrate 
plain error and regarding the prosecutor’s statement that Harris would not be separately punished 
for the murder of three (3) people if granted a life sentence, was objected to and sustained; (5) 
Harris’ argument against the death penalty for the deaths of Bolden and Sutton were not well-
developed or convincing; (6) Harris did not establish that he had a right to the requested 
information, nor that he could get the information from other sources; (7) the errors identified by 
the Court were unquestionably harmless. 
 
Mandatory review of Harris’ death sentences 
 
 NRS 177.055(2) requires the Nevada Supreme Court to determine whether the evidence 
supports the aggravating circumstances; whether the verdict of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and whether the death sentences are 
excessive considering this defendant and the crime.6 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded there 




 The Court affirmed the conclusion of the district court case. Although the district court 
may have erred in admitting the photographs and other errors were present in the trial, the errors 
were harmless. In the presents case, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in 




Cherry, J., with whom Gibbons, J., agrees  
 
 The majority correctly concluded that a number of errors plagued Harris’ trial, but 
incorrectly concluded the verdict was not tainted by such errors. There are three relevant factors 
for evaluating a claim of cumulative error: (1) whether the issue of guilt is close; (2) the quantity 
and character of the error; (3) the gravity of the crime charged.7 Applying a heightened level of 
security, the dissent is not convinced that the errors were harmless. The dissent focused on two 
particular issues, the admission of the photographs and the incomplete verdict form. As for the 
admission of the photographs, the dissent concluded that admission of the photographs was not 
harmless because the Court could not say with confidence that admission did not influence the 
way the jurors interpreted the evidence of Harris’ intent. As for the incomplete jury verdict form, 
the dissent was not convinced that the jurors perfectly understood the instructions given and there 
was no possibility that the jurors did not follow the instructions. Ultimately, the dissent concluded 
the Court should have decided any doubt in favor of the defendant rather than the State. 
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